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With a majority of ‘Yes’ votes in the Constitutional Referendum of 2017, Turkey continued
its drift towards an autocracy. By the will of the Turkish people, this referendum transferred
practically all executive power to president Erdoğan. However, the referendum was con-
fronted with a substantial number of allegations of electoral misconducts and irregularities,
ranging from state coercion of ‘No’ supporters to the controversial validity of unstamped bal-
lots. Here we report the results of an election forensic analysis of recent Turkish elections to
clarify to what extent it is plausible that these voting irregularities were present and able to
influence the outcome of the referendum. We apply statistical forensics tests to identify the
specific nature of the alleged electoral malpractices. In particular, we test whether the data
contains fingerprints for ballot stuffing (submission of multiple ballots per person during the
vote) and voter rigging (coercion and intimidation of voters). Additionally, we perform tests
to identify numerical anomalies in the election results. For the 2017 Constitutional Referen-
dum we find systematic and highly significant statistical support for the presence of both
ballot stuffing and voter rigging. In 11% of stations we find signs for ballot stuffing with a
standard deviation (uncertainty of ballot stuffing probability) of 2.7% (4 sigma event).
Removing such ballot-stuffing-characteristic anomalies from the data would tip the overall
balance from ‘No’ to a majority of ‘Yes’ votes. The 2017 election was followed by early
elections in 2018 to directly vote for a new president who would now be head of state and
government. We find statistical irregularities in the 2018 presidential and parliamentary elec-
tions similar in size and direction to those in 2017. These findings validate that our results
unveil systematic and potentially even fraudulent biases that require further attention in
order to combat electoral malpractices.
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Introduction
In 1996, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, then-mayor of Istanbul, remarked that democracy can be
compared with a bus ride, “once I reach my stop, I get off” [1]. It seems that he arrived at one
of these stops on April 16, 2017, when Turkish people went to the polls to vote on a constitu-
tional reform package that among others would replace Turkey’s parliamentary system with a
presidential one. The ‘Yes’ won by a slight margin—51.4% to 48.6% or 1.38 million votes. The
narrow victory has been questioned by opposition forces alleging voting irregularities and
even electoral fraud [2, 3]. Charges of fraud were fueled by a number of unverified videos that
surfaced on social media and depicted election officials actually stuffing the ballot boxes and
validating piles of voting slips [3, 4]. There were further reports on unverified (i.e., unstamped)
ballots being cast, state coercion of ‘No’ supporters, and election observers being kept from
polling places [2]. The OSCE/ODIHR election observers noted that the referendum took place
on an “unlevel playing field” and that “observers were impeded in their observation during
opening and voting” [5]. Further, there were reported cases of police presence at polling sta-
tions, police checking voter identification before granting access, as well as significant changes
in the ballot validity criteria, effectively “undermining an important safeguard and contradict-
ing the law” [5]. Though cursory evidence for statistical anomalies in results from 2014 has
already been reported [6], until now it was not at all clear to which extent such alleged mal-
practices systematically affected Turkish elections [7, 8].
Soon after the 2017 Constitutional Referendum claims for early presidential and parliamen-
tary elections emerged (originally scheduled for November 2019) which were finally
announced in April 2018 to take place about two months later [9]. Observers noted that this
close scheduling was to the benefit of the incumbent party and president, as the opposition
was not given enough time to organize itself and concerns about worsening economic condi-
tions could have increased the opposition’s chances in 2019 [10]. On June 24 2018 the Turkish
people went again to the polls to vote for a president who would combine for the first time the
office of head of state and head of government. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan emerged as winner of
the presidential election (gaining 52.59% of the votes), while his Justice and Development
Party (AKP) won the parliamentary elections (42.56%). The OSCE/ODIHR election observers
assessed 121 polling stations and noted again serious irregularities, for instance stations that
did not record the number of ballots received, the use of unstamped ballots (in 10% of the
stations), the large presence of police and security officers (12%) that where in some cases
interfering in the voting process, or group voting (4%) [11]. Similar observations were also
reported by experts on Turkish politics [12] (ballot boxes with more votes than registered vot-
ers, ballot boxes with support for only one party, or huge swings in support for certain parties
or candidates within close proximity) and NGOs [13] (carousel voting, lack of or prevention of
observers entering polling stations, etc.). Given that Turkey has more than 150,000 polling sta-
tions, it is not at all clear how such findings from only 121 observations might have impacted
the overall election results. This is where statistical election forensics enters the picture.
For a timely identification of electoral misconduct and to enable more targeted and efficient
election observation missions, the newly emerging field of election forensics seeks to diagnose
—on a fully quantitative and data-driven basis—to which extent a given type of malpractice
might have impacted the outcome of an election [14]. Often these tests focus on a dispropor-
tionate abundance of round numbers in the election results [15, 16] (reflecting the human ten-
dency to choose round numbers when making up the results) or the overrepresentation of
certain digits in the results, such as violations of Benford’s Law [17, 18]. It has been argued that
such tests need to be leveraged with country-specific risk factors to diagnose fraud, such as
socio-economic inequalities or ethnic fractionalization [19]. Another type of election forensic
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tests aims at identifying irregularities in the distributions of vote and turnout numbers across
polling stations, as well as correlations between these distributions [20–25]. These statistical
tools are often complemented by analyses of secondary data, such as exit polls or survey and
sampling data [26, 27].
Here we analyze the election results of the 2017 Turkish constitutional referendum by using
recently proposed election forensics tools. First, we focus on tests that center around the analy-
sis of so-called election fingerprints. We test the data for traces of the systematic occurrence of
ballot stuffing, i.e., the unlawful addition of a substantial numbers of ballots for a given party
[22]. We then perform a test for signs of the occurrence of the systematic coercion and intimi-
dation of voters, i.e., a test for voter rigging [23]. Finally, we complement this analysis by
several additional tests for statistical irregularities, namely a test for the detection of outlier
support [25], the Second Digit Benford’s Law test [18], a test for an overrepresentation of
round numbers in the vote counts [16] and vote shares [24]. The latter tests seek to identify sta-
tistical traces of the outright fabrication of election results at individual polling stations. Our
choice of election forensic tests is motivated by focusing on those tests that allow one to link
certain statistical patterns with specific forms of electoral malpractices, rather than tests that
merely identify “unexpected” correlations in the data. Our work could therefore serve as a
blueprint for how state-of-the-art tools in election forensics might be used in order to clarify
the potential impact of certain types of malpractices on the outcome of a specific election. We
further validate our approach by analyzing results from the 2018 presidential and parliamen-
tary elections. Thereby we inquire to which extent the 2017 results were unusual in terms of
overall voter turnout, vote preferences, as well as in terms of specific regions in which specific
types of vote distortion were particularly prevalent. It is important to note that none of the
forensic tests offer incontrovertible proof for actual election fraud per se. Instead, their purpose
is to clarify whether the widespread occurrence of a certain type of malpractice (as reported in
a small sample of polling stations where elections observers were present) is plausible given the
election data, or if it can be ruled out on statistical grounds.
Materials and methods
Election data
1 Election data. The election data were downloaded from the official website of the Turk-
ish election commission (https://sonuc.ysk.gov.tr). We only considered results from Turkey
itself (“villages”), and did not include election results from polling stations in prisons, customs
authorities, or other countries (the population eligible for voting was not clearly defined out-
side of Turkey). In addition, we removed all polling stations with an electorate of less than 100
to rule out that our results are driven by such outliers. It is important to stress that the concrete
placing of the threshold does not alter the results. Almost identical results are obtained by plac-
ing the threshold at 0, 50 or 200. About 1.3% of all votes are not considered by implementing
the threshold of 100 in 2017, compared to 1.4% of votes in stations with less than 100 voters
for the elections in 2018. For 2017, we therefore analyze data for 153,701 polling stations
grouped in 28,447 neighborhoods, belonging to 1,057 different districts, which are part of 81
provinces. For the 2018 elections, we finally work with results from 168,377 stations in 44,796
neighborhoods, belonging to 1,081 different districts in 81 provinces. For each polling station
i, we extracted the number of voters, Ni, the number of valid votes or turnout, Ti, as well as the
number of votes for the winner, Vi (‘Yes’ votes in 2017, votes for Erdoğan in the 2018 presiden-
tial and for the AKP in the 2018 parliamentary elections). From these we obtained the relative
turnout in percent, ti = Ti/Ni, and the vote percentage, vi = Vi/Ti. Descriptive statistics of the
polling stations are shown in Table 1, where we present mean values and standard deviations
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for Ni, Ti, Vi, ti, and vi. All election data analyzed in this manuscript can be found in the sup-
porting information, S1 Dataset. Up to six election officials or observers may vote at a polling
stations even if they are not registered to vote there. To account for this, we performed a
robustness test where we added six voters to each Ni, which did not change any of the test
results in a discernible way. In the main text we will focus on analyzing results from the 2017
Constitutional referendum and the 2018 presidential election, as they directly relate to the
office of the Turkish president. For the 2018 parliamentary election we will only mention the
main results, with more details being given in the SI.
The cumulative number of ‘Yes’ votes is shown as a function of turnout in Fig 1. For each
level of turnout shown on the x axis, the total number of votes from stations with this level or
lower is shown on the y axis. The vote percentages cross the 50% threshold with the inclusion
of polling stations with a turnout of close to 100%. We find almost the same curve for 2018,
with the threshold of absolute majority being crossed at slightly lower turnout levels.
Results and discussion
Ballot stuffing test
It has been shown that specific types of electoral fraud may introduce odd correlations between
turnout and vote numbers that cannot be accounted for by demographic or geographic
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of polling stations in the 2017 Turkish constitutional referendum and the 2018 elections. We show the mean value hxii(the average is
taken over all polling stations i) and its standard deviation σ(xi) for five different variables xi, namely the number of voters Ni, turnout Ti, votes for winner Vi, relative turn-
out ti and the vote percentage vi.
2017 2018 (pres.) 2018 (parl.)
variable xi hxii σ(xi) hxii σ(xi) hxii σ(xi)
number of voters, Ni 355 78 330 66 330 66
turnout, Ti 304 72 284 59 284 60
votes for winner, Vi 155 69 148 65 118 53
relative turnout, ti 0.86 0.065 0.86 0.058 0.86 0.059
vote percentage, vi 0.52 0.22 0.53 0.22 0.43 0.18
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0204975.t001
Fig 1. ‘Yes’ and ‘Erdoğan’ votes as a function of turnout. For a given level of turnout, the cumulative vote percentage
of stations with this level or lower is shown. In 2017, a majority of more than 50% is achieved with the inclusion of high
turnout stations (blue line). For 2018 we find similar results with slightly higher vote shares (red line).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0204975.g001
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characteristics [22]. The presence of such correlations can be estimated by using so-called elec-
tion fingerprints, i.e., the joint vote–turnout distribution that can be represented in 2d histo-
grams [22]. The fingerprint for the Turkish 2017 referendum is shown in Fig 2(A), where
the color intensity (blue) is proportional to the number of polling stations with the corre-
sponding percentage of votes (x axis) and turnout (y axis). On this fingerprint we superimpose
a box plot (red) that shows for a given level of votes vi the median and dispersion of turnouts ti.
In the absence of nonlinear vote–turnout correlations, the bulk of the distribution in Fig 2(A)
should show a circular or elliptical symmetry. The occurrence of ballot stuffing in a district
would inflate the turnout and at the same time increase the vote percentages. If this happens in
a substantial number of polling stations, the vote and turnout numbers become correlated and
the elliptical symmetry in the fingerprints is broken. For the Turkey 2017 data we observe a
bulk that is spread out particularly along the vote dimension, but is rather narrow in turnouts.
For high votes and high turnout, this bulk is clearly smeared out towards the upper right cor-
ner of the plot—an effect that is particularly visible in the boxplots. Such a correlation is fully
consistent with a ballot stuffing scenario. The fingerprint for the 2018 presidential election, Fig
2(B), is barely distinguishable from the 2017 results; similar observations also hold for the par-
liamentary elections, see S1A Fig.
Fig 2. Election forensic fingerprints for recent Turkish elections. The fingerprints for (A) 2017 and (B) 2018 show the joint vote–turnout distribution
where the blue color intensity indicates the number of stations with a given vote and turnout. Both distributions are smeared out towards high vote and
high turnout numbers, which is characteristic for ballot stuffing. A box plot (red horizontal boxes) shows the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles of the
turnouts associated with a given level of votes, next to whiskers (red dashed lines) that indicate the 95% confidence interval. (C) Standardized
fingerprints as defined in the text for 2017; they can be used to adjust for geographic heterogeneities in the data. (D) Traces of voter rigging can be
identified by comparing the standardized fingerprints of small (red lines) and large (blue) polling stations. Small stations are particularly susceptible to
voter coercion and intimidation, which results in their displacement toward inflated votes and turnout (shift of small stations shown as red lines toward
the upper right corner). (E,F) The standardized fingerprints for 2018 are similar to results from 2017.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0204975.g002
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To assess whether the deviations observed in the fingerprint are indeed statistically signifi-
cant traces compatible with ballot stuffing, we apply the parametric model that was proposed
in [22]. In a nutshell, this model assumes a fingerprint with normally distributed and indepen-
dent vote and turnout numbers, with means and standard deviations estimated from the data.
This does not mean that we assume vote and turnout to be normally distributed—which they
are definitely not [22]—but rather investigate whether the observed deviations from normality
are compatible with ballot stuffing or not. In particular, the model tests if the skew towards
higher numbers in the observed vote distribution coincides with a similar skew in the observed
turnout distribution. The result is a fraud parameter, fi, which represents the fraction of polling
stations with ballot-stuffing-like distortions in their respective vote and turnout numbers.
Note that the parametric model proposed by Klimek et al. also considers a different, extreme
type of ballot stuffing where vote and turnout numbers are both inflated to 100%. In the pres-
ent analysis, there are no indications of such extreme statistical irregularities.
An important aspect of this ballot stuffing test is the need to define a suitable goodness-of-
fit measure between the model output and the actual election results. Originally [22], it was
proposed to use the χ2-divergence [28] between model and data vote distributions, though
other fit criteria and ways to parameterize fraudulent activities in the model have been pro-
posed [29, 30]. With the large number of polling stations in the Turkish data, a more direct
approach to fitting becomes possible by directly comparing the fingerprints from data and
model themselves, i.e., the two-dimensional vote–turnout distributions (for smaller datasets
we found that this procedure can give less robust results due to noise). Let x(ti, vi) be the num-
ber of stations with turnout ti and votes vi in the data, and xm(ti, vi) be the corresponding num-
ber in the ballot stuffing model [22]. Here, we evaluate the ballot stuffing model by identifying
those parameters that minimize the residual sum of squares between x and xm. Results are
taken from 200 sweeps over the feasible parameter range, though we found that means values
and their standard deviations basically do not change anymore after 100 iterations. As different
parameter values may minimize the residual sum of squares in individual iterations, we here
report mean values and standard deviations of the parameters computed over all iterations.
For the Turkey 2017 data we obtain a nonzero fraud parameter,
f 17i ¼ 0:114 0:028: ð1Þ
This is roughly a four sigma effect, meaning that the mean of the distribution of f 17i is four
standard deviations from the assumption of no ballot stuffing, which is f 17i ¼ 0. We find a
shape parameter of α17 = 0.3±0.06. For the presidential election 2018 we again obtain a non-
zero fraud parameter,
f 18i ¼ 0:148 0:045; ð2Þ
i.e., a three sigma effect and a shape parameter of α18 = 0.5 ± 0.2.
The shape parameter measures to which extent the ballot stuffing process in the parametric
model is combined with a deliberate wrong counting or recasting of ballots. A shape parameter
larger than one indicates that ballot stuffing dominates over the wrong counting process. This
means there is a highly significant effect in the Turkish election fingerprint that is compatible
with the ballot stuffing hypothesis. Compared with the irregularities observed in recent Rus-
sian elections, these deviations are relatively weak but nevertheless systematic and statistically
significant. Note that for the parliamentary election we find a two sigma effect with f 18Pi ¼
0:087 0:046 and a higher shape parameter of α18P = 1.3 ± 0.3, see also S1A Fig.
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Voter rigging test
In some cases irregularities in the fingerprints can be explained by geographic heterogeneities,
for instance due to different mobilization effects across urban and rural areas. A way to
account for such natural correlations in the data is to compare each polling station to other sta-
tions that are in close geographic proximity [23]. In the case of Turkey, we compared the vote
and turnout numbers of each station to the average values that have been observed in the same
district. For a polling station i in district A, we define the electoral neighborhood, Nb(i), as all






where μj2Nb(i)(vj) and σj2Nb(i)(vj) denote the mean and standard deviation over all districts in





The so-called standardized fingerprint (2d histogram of the standardized vote and turnout
numbers, Zv and Zt) is shown in Fig 2(C) for 2017, [23]. Using this representation, it becomes
possible to address the issue of voter rigging. The key hypothesis in this test is that smaller poll-
ing stations are more susceptible to coercion and intimidation of voters, since (i) it is easier to
identify opposing individuals, (ii) there are fewer eyewitnesses, and (iii) such stations are vis-
ited less frequently by election observers. Consequently, voter rigging would show up in the
standardized fingerprint by a displacement (a shift towards higher vote and higher turnout
numbers; upper right corner) of the fingerprint of small stations away from the fingerprint of
large stations. Small stations were defined as those with an electorate size, Ni, that is located in
the lowest pth percentile of all electorate sizes. In Fig 2(D) we show the standardized finger-
prints in the form of “isodensity” lines for small (red) and large (blue) polling stations for
p = 10%. The size of the displacement generally depends on the size threshold p and is denoted
by δ(p), see arrow in Fig 2(D). It is apparent that the fingerprints for small stations are obvi-
ously shifted towards the upper right corner of the figure, as would be expected from voter rig-
ging. For the presidential election in 2018 we find again very similar standardized fingerprints,
Fig 2(E) and 2(F); similar observations hold for the parliamentary election, see S1B and S1C
Fig.
As for ballot stuffing, a visual examination of the (standardized) fingerprints alone is not
conclusive and a hypothesis test [23] is needed to assess whether the observed displacement
between small and large polling stations is statistically significant and indeed consistent with
voter rigging. The idea behind the test of Jimenez et al. [23] is to construct a baseline for
expected displacements between small and large stations based on a reference set of trustwor-
thy elections. From these elections a region of an “acceptable displacement size” is derived.
The acceptable displacement size was obtained from an analysis of 21 different elections in ten
countries. For a detailed description of the test and the data used, see [23]. Given the accept-
able region, for a given election, one can now check if the actually observed displacement
between small and large stations for a range of size thresholds p, falls within this region. If the
displacement is larger than the 95% confidence interval of displacements observed in the refer-
ence set, this signals statistical significance at the 5% level. Here, we extend this analysis to the
data of recent Turkish elections; results are shown in Fig 3 and S2 Fig.
Forensic analysis of Turkish elections in 2017–2018
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In Fig 3(A) we show the average displacement, δ(p) between small and large stations in the
standardized fingerprint as a function of p for the extended dataset, including the Turkey 2017
and 2018 elections. For small size thresholds p both Turkish datasets show indeed displace-
ments outside the acceptable region. This indicates statistically significant signs of voter rig-
ging. Compared to Russia and Venezuela, there are weaker signatures for voter rigging in
Turkey. Finally we estimate the impact of the voter rigging effect in the data. For this purpose
we first rank each polling station by its electorate size in decreasing order, and then compute




j<i Ti, over all stations with a rank j less
than i. In Fig 3(B) we present cumi(v) as a function of the rank. The signal for voter rigging
can be seen in the high rank region (small stations) of the cumulative vote percentage curves,
where a sharp increase for the smallest stations is seen (circle). This signal for voter rigging is a
typical pattern that was also found in Russia and Venezuela, see inset 1. In elections where no
Fig 3. Results for the statistical test for voter rigging. (A) An accepted region for the displacements is constructed from the
confidence interval of displacements observed in the reference set of trustworthy elections. There is a significant displacement δ(p)
between small and large polling stations with values that lie outside this accepted region for Turkey 2017 (full dark magenta line) and
2018 (full light magenta line). The displacement sizes are substantially smaller than those observed in Russian or recent Venezuelan
elections (shown as blue and red dashed lines). Reference elections are shown as dotted lines. (B) We rank all stations in the Turkish
elections by their size and show the cumulative vote percentages cumi(v) which are computed over all stations with a size larger than
the given rank. For higher ranks i, an increasing number of small stations is included, leading to a characteristic “hockey stick”. In
2017 it is the addition of small units with inflated votes and turnouts that pushes the results over the 50% line and leads to a majority
of Yes’ votes (highlighted by a red circle). In the insets, we show the same relationship for other elections that (left) show significant
displacements or (right) belong to the set of reference elections.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0204975.g003
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fraudulent actions were reported, these patterns are missing, see inset 2. Again, the data for the
parliamentary election confirms these observations, see S2 Fig For the Turkish constitutional
referendum in 2017 we see that the cumulative effect of the distortions in small stations tipped
the results toward a majority of ‘Yes’ votes. If the small stations would have followed the trends
observed in larger ones, the vote percentage would not have crossed the 50% line in Fig 3(B).
The voter rigging test also allows us to identify which provinces in Turkey contributed
most to the observed irregularities. For this we computed the displacements, δ(p), for each of
the 81 provinces separately, treating each province as if it were an individual country. One
can then average δ(p) over the range 0 < p< 90 to obtain a single number for the magnitude
of voter rigging effects in each province. The ten provinces with the strongest effects of voter
rigging in 2017 in decreasing order are Şanliurfa, Ku¨tahya, Bayburt, Du¨zce, Kı´lı´s, C¸ankiri,
Gu¨mu¨şhane, Bolu, Kastamonu, Tokat with respective average of δ(p) around two and maxi-
mal displacements that range from 2.9 to 4.3. These provinces are spread more or less equally
over the entire country but tend to have a low population density (i.e., four of the above
provinces rank among the ten least populated provinces, whereas the most populated one is
Du¨zce at rank 15 of 81). For the 2018 elections we obtain basically the same set of provinces
for the top ten, with the province of Sı´nop making the cut instead of Tokat for the presiden-
tial election and with Artvı´n and Sı´nop instead of Du¨zce and Kı´lı´s for the parliamentary
elections.
Further tests for statistical irregularities
The Benford test for the second significant digit is one of the most commonly used tools in
election forensics. Benford’s Law states that the second significant digit of the number of votes,
Vi, must be a random number with a certain, specified frequency distribution, namely a power
law [18]. Deviations from this phenomenological law might indicate an influence of human
thought (such as rounding or cutting off certain numbers). However, it has been questioned to
which extent such deviations can indeed be related to concrete forms of electoral fraud, as it
can be quite challenging to define an expected distribution of the second digit in the absence
of fraud [31]. Here, we tested for Benford’s Law for the 2017 results by following the protocol
proposed in [32]. Therefore, we consider only electoral units with three significant digits for
testing the null hypothesis H0: The data is consistent with Benford’s Law for the second signifi-
cant digit. As a measure of being correct when we assert H0 is true, we compute the Bayesian
posterior probability proposed by Pericchi and Torres [18], denoted by P(H0|data). At the
finest aggregation level (polling stations), we observe a large deviation from the law, with
P(H0|data) < 10−120. We repeat the analysis for the next data aggregation level (villages). They
group in average over 3 polling stations. Even at this aggregation level, the distributions deviate
significantly from Benford’s Law, with P(H0|data) < 10−10. In all cases considered so far,
aggregated data distributed on such an order of magnitude confirmed Benford’s Law [32]. The
significant deviations found in Turkey constitute therefore a highly irregular observation.
Another statistical test for irregularities in election data is based on the assumption that vot-
ers are assigned to polling stations in a way that should not depend on their voting behavior.
By randomly permuting the way how voters (as inferred from the data) are assigned to polling
stations in their administrative district, a null model can be formulated for the (non-)random-
ness of the assignment of voters to their polling stations [32]. Following the test procedure
described in [32], we found that the standardized differences between a random and the actual
voter assignment were indeed systematically out of the 99% normal confidence interval. Until
now, such extreme deviations have only been observed in cases that where accompanied by a
substantial amount of fraud claims [32].
Forensic analysis of Turkish elections in 2017–2018
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We applied two other tests that seek to identify the fabrication of vote results. The idea is
that humans have a tendency to pick round numbers when making up data, which might lead
to an overrepresentation of vote counts that end with a 0. In the absence of such fabricated
results, one would expect that the last digits of vote counts are uniformly distributed between 0
and 9 [16]. In all Turkish election considered here we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the
last digits of vote counts on polling station level are uniformly distributed (a Kolmogorov–
Smirnov test gives a p-value of p = 0.80 for 2017, p = 0.36 for the presidential and p = 0.52 for
the parliamentary election in 2018). Round numbers might also be overrepresented in the
coarse vote shares (e.g., 0.50, 0.75, etc.) rather than the vote counts itself [24]. Certain round
percentages, however, might be substantially more frequent than others simply due to numeri-
cal laws (for some vote shares there are simply more possible combinations of vote and turnout
numbers than for others, e.g., 1/2 is more likely to be observed than 501/1000.) Such effects
can be adjusted for by comparing the observed distribution of vote shares with expectations
from a suitable generative model that assumes an unbiased distribution of vote shares, given
the votes and turnouts observed in the election results [24]. Our results suggest that the wide-
spread occurrence of fabricated vote shares is unlikely in the vast majority of polling stations,
with an estimated percentage of affected polling stations of 0.03% (95% confidence interval of
0.02–0.04) in 2017, 0.03% (0.00–0.05) for the presidential and 0.03% (0.02–0.04) for the parlia-
mentary election in 2018.
Conclusion
Here we reported the results of an election forensic analysis of the Turkish constitutional refer-
endum in 2017 and the general elections in 2018. We applied several recently proposed statisti-
cal procedures to test for elementary and low-tech mechanisms of election fraud—ballot
stuffing, voter rigging, and result fabrication, respectively. While we find no consistent evi-
dence for result fabrication, for ballot stuffing and voter rigging we do find systematic and sta-
tistically significant indications in the 2017 and 2018 data. In particular, our analysis suggests
that ballot stuffing might have influenced about 11% of the polling stations and that small sta-
tions showed consistently higher number of ‘Yes’ votes than larger stations in close proximity.
Taken together, the magnitude of these statistical aberrations might have been just large
enough to change the outcome of the referendum from ‘No’ to ‘Yes’ for the 2017 constitutional
referendum. These findings are corroborated by similar results in the 2018 presidential and
parliamentary elections for voter rigging and ballot stuffing (15% and 9%, respectively). Over-
all, the fingerprints and standardized fingerprints for 2017 and the 2018 presidential elections
are barely distinguishable from each other. This suggests that (i) the overall distribution of
votes and turnout across all stations was very similar in these two elections and that (ii) both
datasets show basically the same ballot-stuffing- and voter-rigging-characteristic statistical
anomalies. In this sense, the 2017 results cannot be seen as a one-off lapse. They suggest struc-
tural biases in the Turkish electoral system that require more thorough evaluations. Note that
our results are by no means direct proof of electoral fraud—they signal that the election data is
compatible with the widespread occurrence of such types of fraud and that the data does not
allow us to rule out ballot stuffing and voter rigging (but false positives cannot be ruled out
either). More thorough investigations are needed to establish the actual occurrence of such
malpractices, see also [22, 23, 29, 30] for more detailed discussions of the limitations of these
tests, as well as [17, 31] for limitations that apply to digit-based tests. In general, it should be
noted that statistical election forensic tests, such as the ballot stuffing test, can under no cir-
cumstances offer incontrovertible proof of election fraud by themselves. They always need to
be evaluated in conjunction with external information in order to understand whether the
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observed irregularities might be due to non-fraudulent phenomena, such as heterogeneous
voter mobilization due to strategic voting [29, 30].
In this work, our points of departure were the official reports of election observers [5] that
criticized—in 2017 and 2018—(i) the validity of unstamped and unverified ballots during the
election and (ii) police presence at polling stations to check voter identifications before grant-
ing access. The reported large-scale addition of unverified ballots would clearly result in a
positive test for ballot stuffing, whereas voter intimidation at the polling stations would show
up as a positive test for voter rigging. Our findings are therefore consistent with reports from
observer missions not only qualitatively, but also quantitatively (we obtain percentages of
affected polling stations that are in the same range of values as described in the OSCE reports).
In terms of geographic differences in the voter rigging effect that we measured, we find the
strongest signal for the province of Şanliurfa in 2017, which also features prominently in terms
of statistical voter rigging traces in the 2018 elections. One of the main Turkish opinion polling
houses observed a surprisingly large swing toward “Yes” votes in 2017 compared to what
would have been expected based on potential votes for the AKP in Şanliurfa, next to similar
swings in other Southeastern provinces with substantial Kurdish populations [33]. In 2018 in
Şanliurfa, two election observer recorded a ballot stuffing attempt with their smart phones [34]
and four people were apprehended for vote rigging after authorities received complaints par-
ticularly from that province [35]. More than half of the ballot boxes where Erdoğan received
more than 99% in 2018 were located in Şanliurfa [36]. The vote distortions were therefore
concentrated in the same geographic hotspots in 2017 and 2018, which has two noteworthy
implications. First, this validates our statistical methodology as we pick up the same signals
(geographic concentrations of vote distortions) in two different datasets. Second, and more
importantly, to a certain extent it can be anticipated where potentially fraudulent activities
will be most prevalent in the next election. So besides an ex post analysis of election outcomes,
forensic tools can also be used to evaluate where the presence of observers would be most
crucial.
In terms of discrepancies between the 2018 presidential and parliamentary election, it was
observed that provinces with a high number of boxes with excess votes (i.e., more votes than
voters) coincide with provinces where a disproportionately large fraction of boxes contained
different numbers of presidential and parliamentary ballots, though the rule was “two ballots,
one envelope” [36]. It has been argued that this discrepancy is consistent with the assumption
that individuals who committed ballot stuffing did not add equal numbers of ballots for the
two different elections [36]. Indeed, this observation fits with our estimates of different ballot
stuffing rates for the parliamentary and presidential election, respectively. Taken together,
these reports confirm that the mere presence of serious electoral malpractices in recent Turk-
ish referendums is not a new result of our work here. However, our analysis is the first to show
in a quantitative and data-driven way that the combined impact of the statistical irregularities
associated with such malpractices would have been large enough to tip the overall balance
from ‘No’ to a majority of ‘Yes’ votes in 2017.
Supporting information
S1 Dataset. Election data. The results for each analyzed election are available as single XLSX
file, one sheet per election. The columns correspond to Ni, Ti, Vi, and an index that labels the
administrative regions (“neighborhoods”) used to compute the standardized election finger-
prints.
(XLSX)
Forensic analysis of Turkish elections in 2017–2018
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0204975 October 5, 2018 11 / 14
S1 Fig. Fingerprints for the 2018 parliamentary elections. (A) We show the joint vote–turn-
out distribution where the blue color intensity indicates the number of stations with a given
vote and turnout. The distribution is smeared out towards high vote and high turnout num-
bers, which is characteristic for ballot stuffing. A box plot (red horizontal boxes) shows the
25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles of the turnouts associated with a given level of votes, next to
whiskers (red dashed lines) that indicate the 95% confidence interval. (B) The standardized
fingerprint, as defined in the text for 2017, can be used to adjust for geographic heterogeneities
in the data. (C) Traces of voter rigging can be identified by comparing the standardized finger-
prints of small (red lines) and large (blue) polling stations.
(PDF)
S2 Fig. Results of the voter rigging test for the 2018 parliamentary elections. (A) An
accepted region for the displacements is constructed from the confidence interval of displace-
ments observed in the reference set of trustworthy elections. There is a significant displace-
ment δ(p) between small and large polling stations with values that lie outside this accepted
region for the 2018 parliamentary elections (full magenta line). The displacement sizes are sub-
stantially smaller than those observed in Russian or recent Venezuelan elections (shown as
blue and red dashed lines). Reference elections are shown as dotted lines. (B) We again rank
all stations in Turkey by their size and show the cumulative vote percentages cumi(v) which
are computed over all stations with a size larger than the given rank. For higher ranks i, an
increasing number of small stations is included, giving a characteristic “hockey stick”. In the
insets, we show the same relationship for other elections that (left) show significant displace-
ments or (right) belong to the set of reference elections.
(PDF)
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